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The Consortium of British
Humanitarian Agencies

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND: AN OVERVIEW

February 2010 - February 2012





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This Emergency Response Fund Overview was commissioned by the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) and funded by the Department of International Development (DFID). It was prepared by Action Against Hunger (UK) and Abby Stoddard (Independent Consultant) as part of the Learning and Evaluation component of the CBHA.

GENERAL

The CBHA Emergency Response Fund (ERF) was designed as a fast and independent civil society response to save more lives in humanitarian crises using a peer management system to improve impact and coordination. Of 17 emergencies discussed as potential interventions, the CBHA Board allocated funding in 12, leading to 48 project grants (Table 1 & Graph 1).

A wide range of crises have been funded, and a majority implemented through local partners (Graphs 2 & 3). Of the 15 NGO consortium members, all but one (Oxfam) have applied for and received rapid response funding through the ERF, with Save the Children and Christian Aid showing the highest usage, in terms of both number of allocations and level of grants received.

In order to better understand the comparative effectiveness of this mechanism, individual elements such as additionality, coverage, timeliness and transaction costs need to be assessed in detail. The current document firstly presents findings based on an independent review of the ERF commissioned by the CBHA and implemented by Abby Stoddardⁱ, and then provides an individual summary of each of the 12 ERF responses.

ⁱ Abby Stoddard, A Desk Review of CBHA's Emergency Response Fund Performance, 27 October 2011

Graph 1: CBHA Emergency Response Fund - Overview






Table 1: Grants allocated by emergency, 2010 - 2011

Emergency	Allocations	Total (GBP)
Bangladesh floods 2011	5	325,000
Central America floods 2011	2	219,981
Horn of Africa drought 2011	4	555,814
India Orissa floods 2011	4	222,000
Ivorian refugee crisis 2011	4	197,045
Kyrgyzstan conflict 2010	4	160,425
Myanmar: Cyclone Giri 2010	5	449,351
Pakistan floods 2010	8	750,000
Pakistan floods 2011	3	200,000
Somalia drought 2011	5	442,876
South Kordofan 2011	2	189,258
Sri Lanka floods 2011	6	285,291
Totals: 12	48	3,997,041

Graph 2: Mode of ERF Implementation



Graph 3: ERF responses: type of emergencies




ADDITIONALITY

Additionality is the added value any new funding mechanism has added to international humanitarian response efforts evidenced by greater volume in funding flows. In that respect the ERF has had only a modest effect, due to small scale of the pilot stage and the short term nature of the grants (average grant size was £82,000). The ERF contributed between 0.1% and 10% of total funding received by NGOs but the percentages were higher for those emergencies not covered by a CAP or Flash Appeal, namely Bangladesh, Myanmar, and South Kordofan. The review suggests that in these cases the ERF helped to drive up the volume of funding to low profile emergencies where bilateral donors were not focusing their attention. However, in a number of cases the UK government made no bilateral contributions at all, and in two cases the UK government only awarded bilateral grants to non-NGOs. This illustrates how the ERF has provided additional, direct resources to front line operational NGOs in emergencies where most funding is being channelled through UN agencies.

TIMELINESS


The ERF's focus on rapid application and approval of funding to kick-start emergency response in the early days of a crisis is reflected in markedly quicker disbursement and start-up times compared to other humanitarian funding modalities. With the exception of some of the OCHA-run ERF grants operating at the country-level, the CBHA ERF mechanism is speedier in four key dimensions: onset to ask; ask to allocation; onset to implementation; and allocation to implementation. This has also partly been due the manageably small number of applications that the mechanism has had to process. On average, ERF-funded projects in the cases examined were approved and became operational two to three times quicker than other NGO projects as a whole.

Graph 5¹: Length of lead time for projects in sudden-onset crises



¹ A. Stoddard, sources for graph 6: Data from CBHA and FTS, cases of Pakistan floods (2010), Bangladesh floods, and Pakistan floods (2011)

Graph 6²: Length of lead time for projects in slow-onset crises




² Ibid, Sources for graph 7: Data from CBHA and FTS, cases of the 2011 Ivorian refugees (Liberia), Kyrgyzstan, Horn of Africa drought, and Somalia drought

LEVERAGE


NGO effectiveness is limited by a lack of timely funding at the beginning of an emergency. This leads to a certain level of ‘reservation’ for agencies to respond when their ability to save lives and alleviate suffering is the greatest. In 47% of projects, the ERF was the first source of funding for the agency. When NGOs are on the ground and responding they are better able to source further funding from institutional donors.

While direct attribution cannot be established (due to the lack of a control group) many of the agencies did not have institutional funding secured in advance of ERF disbursements (Graph 7) but a large majority did secure funding after the 30 day ERF response (Graph 8).


Graph 7: Importance of ERF for early action




Breakdown of cases in which ERF was not the first donor



Graph 8: Importance of ERF for sustained action



Breakdown of Post ERF funding



COVERAGE

We define coverage as the number of beneficiaries reached in comparison to the overall estimated total number of people affected, at the time of our intervention. Graph 4 shows the total amount of direct beneficiaries the CBH agencies reached using the ERF. It should be noted that, because of its magnitude (21 million people affected) the Pakistan Floods in 2010 accounts for a large proportion of the total number of people affected.

Coverage can be expected to be modest due to the small scale of the two-year pilot stage, but due to the peer-review process for selecting responses the ERF has the capacity to respond to emergencies which are generally “underserved” (where donors and media are not paying attention). During the Ivorian refugee crisis, which affected 150,000 people, the CBH agencies managed to reach 37,488 people with very limited means (less than £200K) - approximately one fourth (25%) of the affected population at the time (mid April 2011). The Ivorian example shows the potential value for money from a civil society fund.

Graph 4: ERF Overall Reach

Actual: 1,268,951

Planned: 965,923

Total number affected: 43,053,467


TRANSACTION COSTS

NGOs struggle under an increasingly heavy bureaucratic workload associated with institutional grants. The review concluded that CBH agency staff regard the ERF granting system as quite “intense” and “high pressure”, “but nonetheless, straightforward and quick.” Furthermore, it was noted that the administrative work takes place at HQ level and hence the burden falls more on central management than on country support staff. The chain of humanitarian funding through the UN system passes through a number of different parties (the taxpayer to the donor agency, to UN central fund to UN operational agency, and then to the NGO) each stage incurring a transaction cost. A civil society funding mechanism such as the ERF significantly reduces the number of stages, resulting in more money making it to the beneficiaries. Compared to the UN Central Emergency Fund, the review concluded, that the ERF can offer a savings of close to 10%.

MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTABILITY

The pilot has demonstrated that the ERF funding mechanism has improved coordination (at HQ level), enhanced programme quality and supported humanitarian principles. This has been made possible by a 2 stage management system using a peer review process; the ERF Sub-Committee selects projects, and the Learning and Evaluation Sub-Committee reviews project reports. The feedback between the two groups, and the intermediation and quality oversight provided by the CBHA Programme Management Unit ensures continuous incremental improvement in responding on a needs basis and in a consistently timely manner (as the ERF was set out to do). The policies and procedures are designed to minimize bureaucracy yet enable insight, accountability and responsible stewardship.

The following summary sheets for each ERF disbursement were produced soon after ERF Grant Reports were received from all recipients. They are designed to demonstrate the impact of the ERF in each emergency and to promote greater transparency and accountability amongst humanitarian partner organisations.



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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND SUMMARIES

ERF and Other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

			
Pre-ERF	None Available	None Available	Information not available in report
During ERF	None Available	ICCO/DCA/ECHO	Information not available in report
Post-ERF	UNICEF/AECID	UNICEF/ACT Alliance/Secours Islamique Francais/ICCO-Helvetas/ UNHCR (over £120k)	UNHCR/Refugee International Japan/OFDA (over £61k)
Details of Additional Response	WaSH, food security and livelihoods for returnees	WaSH, food assistance, NFIs and clothing	WaSH, food assistance and cash (for fuel and clothing)

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions




Agencies reported that the conflict and resulting refugee crisis in Kyrgyzstan was a low-profile emergency due to the low level of media interest in Central Asia and therefore did not attract a great deal of donor interest. The rapid disbursement of ERF funds was therefore essential to the immediate relief effort.

The relief provided to the local Kyrgyz population came in the form of food distribution, hygiene kits and essential house hold items. This is where the greatest needs lay as basic household possessions had been lost in the conflict and there was a lack of resources amongst beneficiaries to replace them.

Agencies reported good coordination with each other, UN agencies (cluster system) and local authorities, which is essential for effective operations in a volatile security situation. Furthermore, local authorities provided agencies with population lists which were instrumental in identifying the most vulnerable people.

CBHA funding not only enabled an immediate response but also enabled two agencies to scale-up programs with further funding. Agencies reported that the timeliness of funds greatly reduced suffering among the affected population. HelpAge reported that this scale-up in activities enabled them to identify additional vulnerable older people for further assistance that would not have otherwise have been identified.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

			
Intervention	Hygiene Kit distribution to 488 beneficiaries.	2500 families provided with food and hygiene kits. Provision of essential First Aid kits to 120 families in need.	2500 older people received hygiene kits + cash (£7 each), distribution of telephone credits to OPGs ensured vital communication.
Partner	None. Direct Implementation.	Mehr Shevkat	Luch Lotosa, 4 x older people's groups (OPGs), Centre for Social Protection (CSP) and Territorial Soviets.
Existing presence	No prior presence in country	In area of intervention	In area of intervention
Procurement	Local	Local	National
Additional Information	Christian Aid and HelpAge had both long-standing relationships with their partners on the ground and were therefore able to identify needs quickly. ACF compensated for the lack of a partner with a thorough community-level needs assessment.		

Conclusion

As a result of ERF funds Christian Aid and HelpAge were able to increase activities with further funding, for what was otherwise a relatively low profile emergency. This surge significantly increased overall beneficiary numbers of their programmes. The relatively low coverage number is explained by the fact that agencies carefully targeted the most vulnerable members of the affected population; each beneficiary received a comprehensive relief package covering hygiene items, cash (for clothes) and food.





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)


PAKISTAN FLOODS July / August 2010

Total Budget: £750,033

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected: 21,000,000*


Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 215,306 (1.03% of the affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 201,118 (0.96% of the affected population)

*Total Population of Pakistan = 169,708,300 (World Bank, 2009)

**OCHA, Pakistan, Monsoon Floods Sitrep No.22 6 September 2010


CBHA Response Timeline*



*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of the teleconference.









**OCHA, Pakistan, Monsoon Floods Sitrep No.2 30 July 2010

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF & other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

								
Pre-ERF	None Available	None Available	ACT	None Available	None Available	IR Partner offices	None Available	None Available
During ERF	Aus-Aid, Catalan Government and Avaaz Foundation (Totally £432k)	DEC and own funds	ACT/DEC/own funds	DfID, OFDA, Welthungerhilfe, Irish Aid, ECHO, DEC, Scottish Government	SV, OFDA and ECHO	Local Funds (e.g. Meezan Bank)	UNICEF, DEC, Trusts & Foundations	ShelterBox (£301k) and DEC (£2 million)
Post-ERF	Italian Honor, own funds	DEC and own funds	DEC, Scottish Government & own funds	OCHA (£1.5 million)	ECHO and DFID	DEC, CAFOD, DFID, ICMG, UNICEF, WFP, UNOCHA, SIDA, JFC	UNICEF, Trusts & Foundations ECHO, DEC	WFP (£67k)
Details of Additional Response	Part of large Emergency Response Programme (£30 million)	Part of wider integrated CRS programme	Part of larger ACT Alliance response.	£9.6 million covering Food, NFIs, WaSH and medical assistance	Water trucking, latrines, hygiene promotion	2 year recovery programme (Livelihoods, WaSH and health)	Continued services of MHUs. Part of health promotion, disease control, and nutrition activities	Part of large integrated response (40k households for 3 mths)

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

Communities were still in the process of rebuilding their lives after the devastating earthquake of 2005 and the conflict of 2009 when the floods hit. Homes were destroyed, basic items and productive assets lost. Local infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and roads were devastated. Water supplies were destroyed and contaminated leading to a very high risk of disease and mortality among the population.









Agencies reported that existing activity in the area of intervention meant that start-up costs were contained, coordination was efficient and the response therefore rapid. This was due to existing suppliers, established relationships with communities and local authorities, and proven systems from their humanitarian responses in 2005 and 2009.

Initial need assessments conducted in collaboration with local communities by agencies demonstrated the floods had caused damage to property, the loss of possessions and productive assets such as animals and crops. Health, water and hygiene were also found to be in a dire state, causing the population to be at very high risk of water-borne and communicable diseases.

Agencies made an effort to ensure that the most remote of communities were reached. To facilitate access to relief, distributions were carried out as near as possible to affected villages. Agencies described the challenges in prioritizing women in their interventions, and female staff were difficult to hire in order to overcome this challenge. The remoteness of some communities and the heavy rains made access difficult and the security situation volatile. This was mitigated by good relationships with the local community, coordination with the army and the knowledge and experience of local staff.

Coordination through local, national and international fora ensured that there was no duplication and maximum impact in the overall response. Furthermore agencies reported that CBHA coordination at UK level also benefitted the response.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions



								
Intervention	Relief Packages (food, NFIs and hygiene kits) to 730 families and water (1000 families for 2 weeks)	1500 hygiene kits and 1500 shelter kits, 1124 beneficiaries trained in hygiene practices	Food Assistance and NFI kits (1,098 families)	Food Assistance (200 families), NFI & hygiene kits (1000 families) and medical assistance (3,070 beneficiaries)	Hygiene kit distribution and training (2750 families)	Hygiene kits (2,686 families), hygiene promotion (18,802 individuals), installation of 50 latrines, tents (235 families)	Provision of health services with 14 mobile health clinics treating 113,071 individuals.	Provision of safe drinking water, tents, NFI kits, and food rations (800 households)
Partner	Literate Masses	CRS	CWS-PA	IRSP and FF	None. Direct Implementation	None. Direct Implementation	MoH/district health authorities and HelpAge International	None. Direct Implementation.
Existing presence	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention
Procurement	National	National	Local	Local	Local	Local	WHO	National
Additional Information	The ERF grant enabled Action Aid, CAFOD and Islamic Relief to be the first agencies to reach the affected populations in their affected areas. Merlin reported that there were no cases of communicable diseases reported among the population reached, demonstrating considerable impact of their intervention. Established supply networks and competitive procurement enabled Action Aid and Islamic Relief Worldwide to reach more beneficiaries than planned. However partly due to an over-estimation of family sizes the total number of beneficiaries reached was less than planned.							

Conclusion


The rapid release of ERF funds enabled life-saving assistance within a few days, before other funding was available, reaching the most remote of communities who had been overlooked in the response. In some areas the ERF marked the first humanitarian response. Funding decisions at UK level avoided duplication and ensured that responses were complementary.



Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected: 260,000*

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 27,850 (10.7% of affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 49,655 (19.1% of affected population)

*Total Population of Myanmar = 50,019,755 (World Bank, 2009)


*OCHA Myanmar Cyclone Giri Sitrep No.9 23rd November 2010.

CBHA Response Timeline*





*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of the teleconference.

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF & other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

				
Pre-ERF	Own funds (£35k)	None Available	Unknown	Information not available in report
During ERF	French Government (£132k)/UNICEF (£100k)/WFP (£32k)	None Available	ACF (GIK)/AusAid	Information not available in report
Post-ERF	see above	Own funds (£70K)	DfID (£416k) and Vitol (£50k)	Information not available in report
Details of Additional Response	Nutrition activities and NFI distribution	Partner raised £207k for further emergency relief	WaSH	A £5.2 million response covering NFIs, education, child protection, Food Security and Livelihoods and WaSH

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions





The four agencies that received CBHA ERF all referenced recent relevant experience responding to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and the lessons learned contributing to a robust and speedy response. Such previous experience proved valuable for agencies through pre-existing procurement contacts as well as permission from the authorities to work in the country. Familiarity with Myanmar’s national context, and specific regulations and permissions lead CBHA & partner agencies to facilitate a quicker response.

All agencies had existing programmes in the region, and three out of the four agencies responded in new locations. The decisions of where to respond were based on levels of need of the affected population and the coverage of other NGOs.

Initial assessments by agencies showed that the main needs were in terms of basic life possessions, shelter and food aid, whereas water supplies were considered to be sufficient. The four agencies whose results are shown here overcame reported difficulties regarding communications, mainly due to the upcoming elections which led authorities to place restrictions on internet and telephone usage.

ERF funding enabled the 4 agencies to respond immediately and acted as ‘seed’ funding which facilitated substantial further funding to sustain the response. Agencies stressed that ERF funds were vital for immediate assistance and stabilization of the basic needs of the population, decreasing the potential impact of water-borne diseases, for example.



Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

				
Intervention	2933 NFI/Shelter Kits, 953 under 5s SAM prevention, 1859 household food distribution.	3684 households reached with NFI/Shelter Kits and 1 months food rations.	1403 NFI/Shelter Kits + WaSH Assessment.	1918 NFI/Shelter Kits
Partner	MSF-Holland	National Partner	MSF-Holland	Paung Ku: CSO consortium
Existing presence	In a different area of the country	In area of intervention	In a different area of the country	In a different area of the country
Procurement	Local	Local	Local	National
Additional Information	ACF and Merlin (partnering with MSF Holland) took advantage of an established ACF base close by to reach other beneficiaries.			


Conclusion

ERF funding was vital in supporting 50,000 beneficiaries (almost 100% more than planned) for approximately 30 days whilst further funding was secured and long-term recovery plans put in place. Agencies were in a much better position to begin this recovery without having a disease and nutrition crisis to deal with, which was successfully averted with an immediate response made possible by ERF funds.

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected: 991,467*


Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 39,605 (3.99% of affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 55,086 (5.56% of affected population)

*Total Population of Sri Lanka = 20,303,477 (World Bank, 2009)

*OCHA Sitrep Nr.14 15th February 2011


CBHA Response Timeline*



*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of teleconference






**OCHA Sitrep Nr.3 12th January 2011

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF and Other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

					
Pre-ERF	Information not available in report	Information not available in report	Big Lottery fund and EU	Own-funds	Information not available in report
During ERF	Information not available in report	Own funds (£30k)/Jersey (£30k)	Big Lottery fund and EU	Unknown	Information not available in report
Post-ERF	Information not available in report	Own funds (£30k)/LWF (£189k)/CAFOAD (£29k)	Big Lottery fund and EU	Unknown	Information not available in report
Details of Additional Response	Reached 13,800 families	Livelihoods and shelter repair programmes, with DRR elements to build capacity for flood affected	Unknown	Further NFI distribution	Reached 6,250 families and 10,750 children overall with the same response and further funding.






Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

In January 2011 when floods hit, the people of Eastern Sri Lanka were still rebuilding their lives following 30 years of civil war. Rapid needs assessments were carried out and showed that the main needs lay in food assistance and NFIs which had been lost in the floods.

All agencies were able to build on their established presence and experience in responding to the Tsunami and/or the conflict which ended in 2009. They were able to benefit from existing networks of community groups, authorities and suppliers, as well as established systems which led to an efficient and speedy response when funds arrived. In addition, agencies reported good coordination, with local communities, local authorities, other NGOs (through the cluster system) and the Disaster Management Center. This avoided duplication and made for a more cohesive response. Government officials and security forces were present in cluster meetings to help with the logistics of the interventions.

Procurement was mostly done on a national level due to a price rise of local products because of road blocks and increased demand. Agencies cited two particular challenges in the implementation. Firstly, the danger of groups appropriating distributions for political gain, which was mitigated by adhering to strict beneficiary criteria. Secondly the unpredictable rains proved a problem for transporting relief supplies.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

					
Intervention	NFIs and food distribution	NFIs (1917hhs) , food packages (3265hhs)	1500 older people received NFI packs and WaSH items, medical treatments to 3463 older people	NFI packs and counseling sessions (3225 hhs)	Distribution of household kits (923 families), children's clothes (4000 children), infant kits(250 families) and food assistance (2890 children)
Partner	None. Direct Implementation	OfERR	Senior Citizens Committees	IRSL/MFCD	None. Direct Implementation
Existing presence	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention
Procurement	National	Local	National	National	National & Local
Additional Information	In the case of Christian Aid and Save The Children, the needs assessments were carried out in collaboration with the local authority, which also ensured that the most vulnerable flood victims were targeted. Care and Islamic Relief reported competitive procurement processes, which enabled an increase in planned beneficiaries. HelpAge International demonstrated particularly impressive accountability, incorporating beneficiaries at all stages (needs assessment, design, methodology), made possible by their strong relationship with Senior Citizen Committees.				

Conclusion

All agencies remarked upon the timeliness of ERF funds as being crucial for enabling them to reach more beneficiaries and to address needs that would have otherwise been overlooked. A population vulnerable to man-made and natural disasters was given vital immediate assistance. Competitive procurement processes and efficient programming meant that an impressive 83% of ERF funds went on supplies and materials. Furthermore the superior level of coordination between agencies, local communities and authorities cannot be underestimated. This efficiency enabled agencies to reach over 15,000 more beneficiaries than planned.





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)


SOMALIA DROUGHT February / March 2011

Total Budget: £440,707

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities Somalia



Coverage

Total number of people affected: 2.4 million*


Total number of beneficiaries (planned): 151,528 (6.3% of the affected population)

Total number of beneficiaries (actual): 187,811 (7.8% of the affected population)

*Total Population of Somalia = 9,330,872 (World Bank 2010)


*Food Security and Nutritional Analysis Unit-Somalia (FSNAU), January 2011

CBHA Response Timeline*




*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours from the teleconference

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days

ERF & other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)





				
Pre-ERF	ECHO (but not secured yet)	ECHO: £1.5 million	UN-CHF, WHO, and SIDA	Information not available in report
During ERF	ECHO (secured)	Information not available in report	UN-CHF, WHO, and SIDA	DANIDA
Post-ERF	Information not available in report	Information not available in report	Islamic Development Bank: £350K; WHO: £150K.	ERF Horn of Africa: £40K

Similarities between Somalia CBHA ERF interventions

They were present and well-established in Somalia prior to the CBHA funded ERF intervention. The interventions worked largely in parallel of agencies' ongoing programmes. All four agencies were approached by either local or regional authorities to respond to the crisis. All worked through village communities (pre-established relations) and consulted the population in advance of project implementation.

They strengthened their response with surge capacity and were able to start their projects timely. All of the agencies procured locally for most of their programme inputs, but some agencies had to get the aqua tablets from Nairobi, Kenya. Agencies benefitted from pre-established procurement/implementation contacts, for example ACF was able to negotiate cheaper water trucking terms and IRC had an already established system for money transferring.

Differences between Somalia CBHA ERF interventions

				
Water provision*	5 liters	7.5 liters	8.5 liters	5 liters
Duration of water provision	Information not available in report	25 days	20 days	30 days
Methodology of delivery	Delivery of water to distribution points (in villages) and distribution of aqua tablets at household level.	Delivery of water to distribution points, monitor through recruited water monitors, with distribution of chlorine tablets at household level for 25 days.	Delivery of water to 'point of use', monitor through locally recruited and trained water monitors and aqua tablets distribution.	Delivery of water to berkats at community level, water treatment at berkat level.

*Sphere Indicator is 5 liters per person per day for drinking water (not including household use)

Conclusion

The ERF filled a funding gap for agencies to support approximately 190,000 vulnerable people for approximately 30 days with water while they waited for the onset of the rains. The rains never came but then the humanitarian system started to support the situation more broadly. Nevertheless, waiting for the situation to deteriorate is always more costly, and the agencies with ERF funding were able to scale up their programmes which also helped them source further funding for this crisis.





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)


IVORIAN REFUGEE CRISIS March / April 2011

Total Budget: £197,046

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage


Total number of refugees into Liberia: 150,000*

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 72,675 (48.5% of affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 37,488 (25% of affected population)

*UNMIL Sitrep No.11 15th April 2011


CBHA Response Timeline*



*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of the teleconference.




**UNMIL Sitrep No. 7 6-12th March 2011

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF & other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

				
Pre-ERF	None available	Information not available in report	Own and pooled funds	CEF & EIE (£90,000)
During ERF	Own funds (£57,000)	Information not available in report	UNICEF/UNHCR and in-kind donation from WFP	UNHCR (£399,000)
Post-ERF	Own funds (£172,000), Trocaire (£45,000)	UNICER/UNHCR/OFDA	Own and pooled funds	Dfid (£500,000), UNICEF (421,000)
Details of Additional Response	ERF funded activities part of large integrated response including WaSH, FS, shelter, psychosocial and protection.	ERF funded assistance part of wider response.	Own funds used to initially scale-up activities, but not sufficient.	FOB Services to be extended with other funding.

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

After the disputed elections in November 2010, fighting began in the Cote D'Ivoire causing an estimated 150,000* refugees into Liberia by April 15th 2011. ERF funds enabled rapid assistance before the crisis garnered significant attention from other donors. The establishment of a robust response enabled further funding to be easily secured.





Agencies described the advantage of having pre-existing programmes, established relationships and familiarity with the area in enabling them to respond quickly and effectively.

Needs assessments by all agencies were already underway before the ERF funding period, therefore activities were launched as soon as funding was granted. These were conducted in consultation with both refugee and host communities. Replacement of essential household supplies, lost when fleeing, and medical services were considered the most pressing needs.

Agencies reported good coordination with local and international actors that avoided duplication of relief services. Close cooperation with the Liberian MoH and Community Health Teams, built upon their capacity to respond to such situations in the future.

There were particularly high logistics costs for this response. This was due to the poor condition of roads in Liberia and the remoteness of the programmes. *UNHCR, 21st July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4e27f0e56.html>

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

				
Intervention	625 Household sets, 2125 sets of basic life support items, and hygiene awareness.	De-worming of 6000 children, 95 ambulance call-outs, 42 hygiene promoters trained, 100 health volunteers trained, hygiene facility reparation, supplies distributed to 9 health centres.	7 health centres and 1 mobile clinic strengthened to cope with refugees.	Established Forward Operating Base (FOB) + mobile teams to inform arriving refugees of services available. Vulnerable and separated children were identified. Protection systems strengthened. 182 refugee children sent to school.
Partner	Caritas Gbarnga	EQUIP and MAP	None. Direct implementation.	None. Direct implementation.
Existing Presence	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In a different area of the country
Procurement	National	Donor	Local and WFP	Local
Additional Information	Fighting within the Cote D'Ivoire prevented planned Tearfund activities of water distribution (24,000 beneficiaries planned) and health visits (5056 beneficiaries planned), having a significant effect on the numbers of beneficiaries reached. Nevertheless CBHA agencies still managed to reach 25% of the affected population at the time of ERF funding. Save the Children used these funds to establish a Forward Operating Base which with further funding remained operational for some time after the ERF funding period.			

Conclusion

ERF funds enabled agencies to be on the ground before the influx of refugees intensified. CBHA agencies assisted 25% of the affected population with £197,000 in the form of NFI distribution, vital support to health structures, child protection and essential camp management. After the ERF period refugees continued to flow into Liberia, reaching a peak of 153,000* in July 2011. ERF funds enabled agencies to provide immediate relief and also establish support structures from which they were able to scale up operations when further funding arrived.

*UNHCR, 21st July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4e27f0e56.html>





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF) HORN OF AFRICA CRISIS


April / May 2011

Total Budget: £555,814

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

- Total number of people affected: 8,800,000*
- Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 203,728 (2.3% of the affected population)
- Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 265,658 (3% of the affected population)

*OCHA East Africa Drought Sitrep No.3 10 June 2011

CBHA Response Timeline*

Event	13 th April	14 th April	15 th April	16 - 18 th April	19 th April	20 th April
Slow Onset Emergency						
A number of complex factors, including persistently low levels of rainfall cause 8.8 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance						
CBHA alert	CBHA alert	-	CBHA telecon	-	ERF applications due	ERF allocation meeting

*ERF funding decisions are generally made within 60 hours of the teleconference, but in slow onset crises agencies have 48 hours (instead of 24 hours) to submit proposals.

**OCHA East Africa Drought Sitrep No.2 30 April 2011

Agency Response Timeline*

Agency	Before ERF	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
Action Aid		█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█
Christian Aid		█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█
Concern		█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█
Save the Children		█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█

Needs Assessment (Days 19-26) | Preparation for ERF implementation (Days 27-30) | Implementation of ERF activities (Days 31-48)

*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF & other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

				
Pre-ERF	Government of Kenya & WFP	CA own funds (£63K for Kenya + £63K for Ethiopia)	None Available	DANIDA
During ERF	As above	As above	Own funds and other donors	None Available
Post-ERF	AusAid, DEC, AGIRE, ACCD (tbc), Madrid County Government (tbc)	CA Own funds, DEC Appeal and various backdonors from July 2011	Own funds and other donors	CHF, ECHO and AusAID (Somalia), DfID and OFDA
Details of Additional Response	Post ERF funds are supporting a 3 year plan focusing on drought response and resilience building	Climate change adaptation and livelihoods DRR programme. (£47k)	5-year food security and livelihoods project. Further funds secured to continue scale-up for 6 months.	Further 3 month emergency WaSH project (Ethiopia), CBI (Somalia). Livestock destocking (Ethiopia and Kenya).

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

Although the governments in the Horn and international community did not declare the drought an emergency until later in the year (the government of Kenya declared the drought a national disaster on May 29th 2011), agencies had been warning a deteriorating situation for months. Tens of thousands of people in Kenya and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa had been suffering from food and water shortages since the beginning of April. This ERF disbursement was intended to support communities through to April/May rains, but these never came and led to a severe crisis in the Horn of Africa.





CBHA agencies targeted the most vulnerable members of pastoral communities, with access to water being one of the assessed criteria. Agencies reported how targeting was done at village level to ensure that the most vulnerable were reached.

Critical water provision eased pressure on women, reduced disease and enabled communities to get on with other drought coping strategies. The cash injection from de-stocking of livestock provided a crucial stimulus for the local economy and enabled families to purchase other basic items (food, medicine etc.). The provision of food and water in schools enabled them to remain open and kept attendance levels up. Hospitals and health centres were also targeted, which enabled them to continue to function.

Agencies referred to established structures, relationships with communities and local partners, and previous experience of similar responses in the area as contributing to an efficient and effective CBHA response. All agencies remarked upon the challenges of transportation, mainly due to inflated prices as a result of the intensified activity of NGOs.

Lastly, agencies reported that CBHA support allowed them to start, scale-up or maintain activities in the region during dire times when international support was limited. This injection therefore strengthened agencies' capacity in the region and their ability to scale up when funding came through in the summer of 2011.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions


				
Intervention	Increase access to clean safe drinking water (water-trucking and borehole repairs) school feeding/water provision, and de-stocking of shoats (cash injection) and meat distribution.	Water Provision (11,507 hhs), provision of 206 community water tanks, provision of livestock feed (480 hh), fuel provision, 19 schools kept open.	Livestock de-stocking (cash injection) and distribution of meat (1805 families benefiting), supplementary feeding (buying of hay – cash injection) and treatment of young animals (700 households benefiting).	Emergency water trucking and fuel subsidy for boreholes (Kenya). Provision of water and water treatment chemicals, and hygiene promotion (Ethiopia). Water provision (Somalia).
Partner	Direct Implementation	CCSMKE and Northern Aid	CIFA	Direct Implementation
Existing presence	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement	Local and National	Local	Local and National	Local and National
Additional Information	Save The Children's water provision supported a wider response of health and nutrition activities. Concern's response was particularly sustainable as they coupled de-stocking with animal treatment, enabling farmers not only to gain cash but also to retain income generation for the future. The purchase of animal feed also provided another stimulus to the local economy.			

Conclusion


The ERF funded the alleviation of suffering for over ¼ million people who would have otherwise been without water and basic living support during a one month period. The provision of water enabled more substantial interventions to continue and averted the closure of schools, health centres and hospitals, which would have had fatal results. The funding was timely and appropriate as the emergency lacked sufficient attention, and it helped some communities fight the impact of the drought at an earlier stage. Despite the huge scale of this emergency ERF funded activities were able to make a significant impact.



Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected (IDPs - approximate number): 200,000*


Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 21,220 (11% of the affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 29,200 (15% of the affected population)

*Total population of South Kordofan 1,066,171 (www.sudan.gov.sd)


*Sudan, South Kordofan, OCHA Sitrep No. 13 31/07/2011

CBHA Response Timeline*



*Sudan, South Kordofan, OCHA Sitrep No. 8 25/06/2011

Agency Response Timeline*



Agency 1 completed its distribution on the 18th of September 2011



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF and other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

	Agency 1	Agency 2
Pre-ERF	UNDP/OCHA (CHF) (£300k)	Irish Aid (£87k) and Sister Agency 1 (£46k)
During ERF	ECHO (£702k) and SIDA (£447k)	Sister Agency 2 (£87k) and Sister Agency 3 (£261k)
Post-ERF	CIDA (£638k) and USAID/OFDA (£1.4 million)	Sister Agency 4 (£114,583)
Details of Additional Response	Nutrition, education, protection, WaSH and FSL	Provision of shelter, distribution of NFIs, medical supplies and WaSH

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

Large numbers of IDPs in South Kordofan exacerbated challenges for local communities, who even before this pressure lacked suitable shelter.

The CBHA intervention targeted IDPs to provide essential household supplies and shelter materials so that schools could remain open. Although the security situation made usual participatory methods difficult, communities were still able to play an active role in the targeting and registration of beneficiaries.

Collaboration with local authorities and community leaders determined needs and gained support for the response. Agencies were also able to ascertain the coverage of support from other NGOs avoiding duplication. This collaborative process was long but essential in order to gain the access and facilitate a smooth response to remote communities not reached by other agencies. One agency was compelled to carry out needs assessments remotely due to the volatile security situation. Beneficiary involvement influenced the content of the NFI packages.

The security situation (specifically aerial bombardments) made standard practices difficult. Due to a highly sensitive environment during the ongoing conflict, obtaining approval for the transportation of supplies was long and drawn out which, coupled with the unwillingness of most flight providers to fly to South Kordofan, caused delays in the response. Further delays were caused because the identification of beneficiaries was made difficult as they were forced to seek shelter with host families, because the government discouraged the formation of camps.

These challenges meant that coordination was especially important. Agencies collaborated with local leaders, local government, sister NGOs, the Humanitarian Aid Commission and UN agencies, in order to overcome access and transportation issues. Furthermore duplication was avoided and the intervention was designed to complement WFP (food) and WHO/UNICEF (medical) responses.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

	Agency 1	Agency 2
Intervention	Distribution of NFI packages (including shelter and hygiene items) to 4,600 families	Distribution of NFI packages (for 200 households) and provision of airfreight
Partner	None. Direct Implementation	Local partner and Sister Agency Partner
Existing presence	Yes	Yes
Procurement	Local	From Nairobi, Kenya

Conclusion

ERF funding enabled agencies to begin their response which was then built upon with further funding and additional interventions, including community nutrition programmes, education, protection, WaSH and FSL. The funding was crucial in meeting the critical needs of the conflict affected population. The intervention enabled the reopening of 15 schools and helped maintain the credibility of the CBHA agencies. There were considerable delays in the implementation of the response due to the challenging security situation and the difficulties with access. However good coordination and participatory methods enabled agencies to surmount these challenges and reach an impressive 15% of the affected population.





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)


PAKISTAN FLOODS August / September 2011

Total Budget: £200,000

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected: 5,400,000*

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 39,562 (0.73% of the affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 32,875 (0.61% of the affected population)

*173,593,380 Total population of Pakistan (World Bank 2010)


*UNICEF Situation Report No. 2 19 September 2011 Monsoon Floods in Pakistan

CBHA Response Timeline*






*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of teleconference

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF Funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF and Other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

			
Pre-ERF	Plan International (£77k)	None available	None Available
During ERF	UNICEF (£320k)	Tearfund UK (£123k)	SHO (£199k)/WV- Germany (£62k)/WV Australia (£67k)
Post-ERF	AusAid (£456k)/SIDA (£50k)/JOAC (£31k)	Tearfund UK (£442k)	WFP (£128k) + others pending
Details of Additional Response	Additional Shelter kits, WaSH, child protection and psychosocial support, dry food rations, mosquito nets; all reaching 5000 families.	Emergency response through five local partners and directly implemented programme; emergency food, shelter, mosquito nets, health and hygiene kits, cash grants targeting in total 7,700 households.	Part of multi-sectoral emergency response aimed at feeding 20000 HHs, run ten health clinics, 20 child friendly spaces, commence work with 4000 mothers and infants and deliver essential household items to 7500 families.

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

The flooding in Sindh province in August 2011, although not as widespread, was as devastating to those affected as the floods in 2010. Initial assessments showed a wide range of needs of the flood-affected population. In Badin 79% of houses were completely damaged and remaining 21% partially damaged, 76% had access to no or little drinking water, and 96% had no access to cooking facilities (World Vision report).

Initial assessments from agencies determined that the needs of the population covered the areas of shelter, food, water and sanitation, and the protection of children. All agencies engaged with communities to determine the needs of the population, to decide the shape of the intervention, to collate the beneficiary lists and also assisted in distributions. This engagement took the form of FDGs (including uniquely women FDGs), key informant interviews and meetings with local authorities.




Agencies experienced frustration at not be granted immediate access to the affected population, but well established relationships with communities enabled needs assessments to start promptly nevertheless.

Good coordination with the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum, cluster meetings and between other NGOs, ensured that there was no duplication of intervention (in terms of geographic and sectoral area of intervention) and therefore maximized coverage with the available resources.

Well established links with local communities and authorities facilitated a prompt response. Experience and preparation from the flood response of August 2010 hugely contributed to a fast and comprehensive response, as there were pre-positioned stocks, established systems and coordination mechanisms.

Agencies faced the challenge of continued monsoon rains which restricted activity, as well as the security situation in Kirachi which hindered the procurement of essential supplies.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

			
Intervention	4,837 shelter kits distributed	Water containers and aqua tabs, shelter kits and hygiene kits, distributed to 747 households, and dry food rations to 842 households	Provision of drinking water, tents and NFIs distributed to 375 households
Partner	LHDP	No	Muslim Aid
Existing presence	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement	National	Local/National	National
Additional Information	Plan were able to reach 287 more families than planned as shelter kits were secured at a better price than anticipated, and fewer community mobilizers were engaged for distribution resulting in savings. However due to an out-dated estimation of family sizes (7 per family) the actual beneficiary number was less than planned. World Vision reported that the rapidity of CBHA funding enabled the purchase of water materials to supplement water tabs (purchased under another grant) reducing the numbers of those affected by water borne diseases.		

Conclusion

The speed of ERF funding enable CBHA agencies to be some of the first NGOs to reach the affected population and begin reducing the impact of the floods on lives. Agencies were well positioned and prepared to respond immediately and ERF facilitated a rapid response. The availability of funds, fresh experience of flood response in the region and the dedication of agency staff enabled CBHA agencies to reach over 30,000 beneficiaries with £200,000 within 30 days of the floods devastating peoples lives.





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)

BANGLADESH FLOODS


August / September 2011

Total Budget: £325,000

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected (estimated number): 1,250,000*


Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 86,275 (6.9% of the affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 90,713 (7.3% of the affected population)

*Total population of Bangladesh = 148,692,131 (World Bank, 2010)


*Christian Aid Sitrep, 16th Aug 2011

CBHA Response Timeline*








*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of teleconference

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF and Other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

					
Pre-ERF	None available	None available	None available	Own funds (£30k)	None available
During ERF	None available	Own funds (£50k) Other institutional funds (£30k)	None available	None available	Jersey Overseas Aid (£28k)
Post-ERF	CAFOD (£50k)	ECHO (£343k)	HelpAge International (£65k)	ECHO (£343k)	None available
Details of Additional Response	Partner only implemented ERF grant. CAFOD have ongoing DRR programme in neighbouring district.	Will focus on shelter, livelihoods and DRR in the early recovery phase.	Will continue with providing support for older people focussing on health and NFI components.	Wider response focusses on providing support in the areas of shelter, WASH, child protection, and cash grants.	Partner is planning to operate a rehabilitation project.

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions






Incessant monsoon rains since late July combined with a variety of other factors, such as lack of adequate drainage; mismanagement and lack of maintenance of embankments built along the rivers in the 1960s; increased sediment load and siltation of rivers; and restricted river flow due to embankments built for shrimp farming along the coast, caused widespread flooding in Southern Bangladesh. The situation in Bangladesh is being worsened by the flood situation in West Bengal, India, which caused water levels in the rivers in the southwest of Bangladesh to rise as well. Hence, to some extent this is a slow onset disaster because the severity of the floods builds up over time.

All the agencies that responded to the situation were present locally and felt that local and national governmental, as well as a wider international response was inadequate. Hence, the ERF enabled the local partners of the NGOs to respond to the situation. The local partners are all well-grounded in the communities and have in-depth knowledge of the areas affected as well as experience of responding to similar emergencies in the past. All agencies reported to have put distribution lists and relief packages together with the community (through door-to-door visits, surveys, council meetings and/or focus groups). The agencies found that the number of affected families was much higher than anticipated and were hence under considerable pressure to reach more people. This also meant that agencies took more time agreeing beneficiary lists at the local union level. All local agencies used volunteers (many being students on their Eid holiday) for the distribution of relief items.

All NGOs gained early approval from the Bangladesh National Affairs Bureau for the distribution of relief items, and reported that Government District administration and other local officials expressed their appreciation of the agencies' timely response. All agencies referred to multiple coordination mechanisms, both through NGO networks as well as Union (UNDMC) and Upazilla (UzDMC) Disaster Management Committees. The national holiday Eid slowed down the response of some actors (i.e. because markets are closed), but the agencies implementing ERF grants had taken this into consideration when planning their response.

Many of the local agencies were involved in DRR or disaster preparedness activities of some sort, and concluded that the intervention highlighted the need for increased consideration and incorporation of DRR measures, including advocacy on river dredging, effective drainage systems and strengthening of embankments. The CBHA members that supported local partners with this response expressed an interest to further develop the local capacity of their partner agency and help them in areas that proved difficult for some (such as warehouse management).

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

					
Intervention	Food and NFIs (household & WASH)	Shelter & Food Security (NFIs)	WASH, Health, Shelter, Food Security (NFIs)	WASH, Shelter, NFIs	WASH, Nutrition
Partner	Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM)	CCDB and Shushilan	Uttaran	Uttaran	Bangladesh Nazarene Mission
Existing presence	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention
Procurement	National	Information not available in report	Information not available in report	Information not available in report	Local
Additional Information	Beneficiaries fed back that the strategy of providing standard packages to all households (regardless of household size) should be revisited but the agencies explained that it is challenging to balance the need of rapid response with the specific needs of different sized households. CAFOD reported that after input from beneficiaries they changed the planned contents of their food package (i.e. inclusion of Suji (semolina for children) and sugar instead of onions and elimination of jerry cans because beneficiaries said they managed to save them during the flooding). HelpAge reported that being the only agency specifically targeting older people, lead to visibility of older people with other agencies and encouraged other agencies to think about including older people as well. HelpAge also reported that the provision of walking sticks as mobility aids received a huge positive response from the older people in the community.				

Conclusion

The CBHA ERF enabled a response of local actors for a seasonal emergency that received little to no attention internationally. All agencies worked through local partners who had a long history of working in the area and intensively engaged the local communities in their response. Relief packages were compiled with input from beneficiaries and some agencies changed the compilation of their package as of a result of it. Due to the large size of the affected population modest CBHA resources could only reach a small percentage of affected population, but agencies reached slightly more people than planned and focused on addressing the needs of the very poor and marginalized.





CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)

INDIA FLOODS


September / October 2011

Total Budget: £222,000

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected (estimated number): 1,700,000*

Total number of beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 52,425 (3.1% of the affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 265,658 (15.6% of the affected population)

*Total population of Orissa = 36,804,660 (India Government, 2011)


*Indian Red Cross & Save the Children Sitreps, 10 & 12 September 2011

CBHA Response Timeline*




*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of teleconference

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF & other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

				
Pre-ERF (donor & amount)	None available	Christian Aid (£30K)	Concern (£200K)	None available
During ERF (donor & amount)	None available	Jersey/JOAC (£30K)	None available	None available
Post-ERF (donor & amount)	None available		ECHO (€136K)	None available
Details of Additional Response	ERF funded only humanitarian response but development activities will continue.	Planning rehabilitation and development activities with communities.	Continue with Cash for Work activities in PUri and Cuttack.	No plans for additional response/rehabilitation until further funding is secured.

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions

A severe flood caused by flooding of Mahanadi and other rivers in the Eastern state of Orissa has affected more than 1.7 million people and has created havoc through submerging 2788 villages spread over 19 districts. 80,720 hectares of crop are submerged and 22 breaches have been created. On the 11th of September 5000 people were reported to have been evacuated from low lying areas to safer places.

Most of the affected population are landless labourers and small and marginal farmers who share cropping as tenants of land. The loss of standing crop is a huge livelihood loss for them, and the lack of asset or access to resources and labour (especially for the poor, Dalits, tribal and landless labourers) due to flood has significantly reduced their coping ability and has made people dependent on government relief supplies. The agencies that responded to this crisis specifically tried to address the needs of these vulnerable groups, including Dalits. The emphasis on agencies' responses was on the provision of hygiene kits, food and shelter (mostly through tarpaulin distributions).

All the agencies have a long established presence in Orissa, India, and established through extensive assessments what the priority needs of the affected population were whilst involving local community organizations and village committees. All agencies and local partners had previous experience responding to floods and had established contacts for logistics etc. Agencies were also well coordinated in the area as reports indicated good awareness of each other's projects and their scope as well as the governments' activities. It was even explained that project locations and activities were changed after coordination with other agencies to avoid duplication and maximize impact.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

				
Intervention	Medical, WASH, Livelihoods, Shelter and Food (NFIs)	Food Security, NFIs (household kits)	Shelter & WASH	WASH, Shelter, Food Security
Partner	Samuhik Marudi Pratikar, Udyam (SMPUP) in Bargarh district, Sneha Abhiyan in Jagatsinghpur district and Adventure in Puri district	CASA (Churches Organisation of Social Action)	SWAD (Society for Women Empowerment and Development); DSS(Darbar sahitya sangha)Solar and Banki adiviasi harijan Kalyan Parishad (BAAHKP)	World Vision India
Existing presence	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention	In area of intervention
Procurement	Local	Local	National	National & Local
Additional Information	Some agencies were able to procure resources from the government which caused them to save costs.			

Conclusion

As can be seen in the tables above there was little funding available to agencies to respond to this emergency. Only two agencies had internal funds to allocate, and hence the CBHA enabled these agencies to assist almost 70,000 people that otherwise would likely not have received assistance. Orissa is a poor and densely populated state which means that crises like floods affect a large number of people and the government is not able to assist all. Furthermore, vulnerable groups, such as Dalits and women are often forgotten. Agencies' long-standing presence in the affected location meant that all completed their operations smoothly and within the 30 day time frame.




CBHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)


CENTRAL AMERICAN FLOODS

October / November 2011 Total Budget: £219,981

Overall ERF Expenditures



ERF Activities



Coverage

Total number of people affected (estimated number): 342,247*

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (planned): 29,624 (8.7% of the affected population)

Total number of direct beneficiaries from ERF activities (actual): 29,624 (8.7% of the affected population)

*Total population of Guatemala: 14,388,929, Honduras: 7,600,524 and El Salvador: 6,192,993 (World Bank, 2010)

**Central America Tropical Depression 12-E, OCHA Situation Report No.1, 17 October 2011


CBHA Response Timeline*



*ERF funding decisions are made within 60 hours of teleconference




**Central America Tropical Depression 12-E, OCHA Situation Report No.1, 17 October 2011

Agency Response Timeline*



*Agencies must begin their response within 7 days of receiving ERF funding and complete the activities within 30 days.

ERF and other funding (when did agencies source other funding?)

		 Guatemala	 El Salvador
Pre-ERF	None available	Own Funds (£12,645)/Formacias de la Comunidad (£21,530)	Swedish cooperative Centre (SCC) (£41,000)
During ERF	Jersey Government (£30k)/own funds (£3k)	None available	PMK (£22,000), Manos Unidas (£26,000), Lizianthus (£5,000), FIAES (£7,000)
Post-ERF	None available	None available	WFP
Details of Additional Response	WaSH activities (rehabilitated of water sources) and livelihoods work	Sanitation works and disinfection of boreholes, cash transfer work and further DRR activities	Livelihoods and climate change activities

Similarities between CBHA ERF Interventions




Initial assessments in all three countries found that serious pollution of water sources by the flooding caused an increase in the risk of poor health and the spread of disease. As a result communities were in grave need of clean water sources. The flooding caused extensive damage to livelihoods, but it was the loss of agriculture and food stores, which meant that food assistance was required. Flooding also caused damage to households meaning there was a need for NFIs (mainly shelter and bedding items).

Needs assessments involved meetings (FGDs) with village leaders, municipalities, local religious leaders, affected families and regional emergency committees as well as questionnaires covering all possible areas of need. Local leaders not only participated in these needs assessments but also facilitated them.

Agency partners took a lead role in deciding the targeting criteria in collaboration with communities, which included families without livelihoods, those without damaged abodes, single parent families and those who had not received support already. Once beneficiaries were identified by communities the lists were cross-checked with the agency partner, who both had a long standing presence in the areas of intervention. Beneficiary involvement in the response extended beyond the planning stages to implementation of activities. Communities were involved in the procurement and distribution process at all levels including the verification of price and quality of items and their collection.

Coordination during the response was reportedly very good between stakeholders (with the exception of WFP and the municipal authorities in Guatemala). This was largely due to the long standing presence of the partners and resulting familiarity with authorities and communities.

Differences between CBHA ERF Interventions

		 Guatemala	 El Salvador
Intervention	Food Aid (1,240 hhs), Hygiene/Household kits (1,360 hhs), matt distribution (100 hhs) and blanket distribution (125 hhs)	Food Aid (2,600 hhs)/WaSH (1,200 hhs)	Food Aid (260 HHs)/WaSH (280 HHs)/Hygiene kits (1580 HHs)/FSL (200 HHs)/medicine (280 HHs)
Partner	PAG/Red Viva	CPDL	CONFRAS-ACUDESBAL
Existing presence	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement	National	Information not available in report	National
Additional Information	Coordination with WFP in Guatemala was slow due to disagreement on the content of the food parcel which explains the delay in implementation. The cleaning of boreholes was also postponed due to the lack of equipment at local level and the lack of access to affected areas because of the flooding. In Honduras strong community links enabled a rapid supply of volunteers to help with the intervention. This also enhanced community ownership of the response. In El Salvador Christian Aid changed their priorities which resulted in the planned WaSH activities (for 800 HHs) because they felt these needs would be covered in other ways.		

Conclusion

The tremendous rainfall in Central America caused by the Tropical Depression 12-E affected over 300,000 people in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras alone, with over 50,000 people needing to be evacuated. Populations were vulnerable and needed immediate assistance in food and water supply as well as NFIs. Although there were coordination problems which delayed the response in Guatemala, the rapid availability of ERF funding enabled agencies to reach over 20,000 people. The long standing presence of agencies facilitated this rapid response, and the response enabled agency partners to strengthen their relationship with coordination bodies and also to identify other vulnerable groups to extend future activities.



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